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ABSTRACT 
Cotton Textiles and the Great Divergence: Lancashire, India and 
Shifting Competitive Advantage, 1600-1850* 
The growth of cotton textile imports into Britain from India opened up new 
opportunities for import substitution as the new cloths, patterns and designs 
became increasingly fashionable. However, high silver wages in Britain as a 
result of high productivity in other tradable goods and services, meant that 
British producers of cotton textiles could not use labour-intensive Indian 
production methods. The growth in British labour productivity that resulted 
from the search for labour-saving technological progress meant that unit 
labour costs became lower than in India despite the much higher wages in 
Britain. However, the full effects of the rise in British productivity were delayed 
until after the Napoleonic Wars by increasing wage and raw cotton costs 
before supply adjusted to the major increase in demand for inputs. On 
balance, the effects of British protective measures were neutral. 
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2I. INTRODUCTION
During the early modern period, India was the world’s main producer of cotton
textiles, with a substantial export trade. Indian textiles were exported to Britain on a
large scale from the seventeenth century (Baines, 1835: 55-83; Robson, 1957: 1). By
the early nineteenth century, however, Britain had become the world’s most important
cotton textile producer, dominating world export markets, and even exporting to India
(Ellison, 1886: 57-70; Robson, 1957: 1-3). This dramatic change in international
competitive advantage during the Industrial Revolution was surely one of the key
episodes in the Great Divergence of living standards between Europe and Asia.
However, the literature on the British cotton industry has traditionally focused on
domestic production issues, and has had relatively little to say about interactions
between India and Britain (Ellison, 1886: 14-70, Landes, 1969: 82-88; Rose, 2000:
22-37).1 To the extent that a comparative perspective has been taken at all, it has been
conventional to compare Britain with other European countries or the United States
(Landes, 1969: 159-169; Rose, 2000: 37-56). At the same time, the literature on the
Indian cotton industry has usually treated industrial decline as a political issue, driven
entirely by colonial policy, and paid little attention to underlying economic forces
such as Anglo-Indian productivity differences (Dutt, 1906; Thorner, 1962; Bagchi,
1982).
This paper anlayses the shift in competitive advantage in terms of changing
unit labour costs, emphasising the interactions between Britain and India. The growth
of cotton textile imports into Britain via the East India Company from the seventeenth
century opened up new opportunities for British manufacturers via a strategy of
3import substitution and re-export substitution, as the new cloths, patterns and designs
became increasingly fashionable (de Vries, 1993; Berg, 2002; Inikori, 2002: 428).
However, high silver wages in Britain as a result of high productivity in other tradable
goods and services, meant that British manufacturers could not use labour-intensive
Indian production methods. Broadberry and Gupta (2006) show that an unskilled
labourer in India earned little more than 20 per cent of the English unskilled wage as
early as 1600, when Indian wages are converted to pounds sterling at the prevailing
exchange rate. Low Indian wages acted as a spur to labour-saving technological
progress in the British cotton textile industry. As British productivity increased, a
point was reached where Britain’s higher wages were more than offset so that unit
labour costs were lower in Britain and the reversal of competitive advantage occurred.
However, the shift was delayed in international markets during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries by rising wage and raw cotton prices in Britain as the
increase in production put pressure on labour and material input markets. The shift in
competitiveness in the Indian market was delayed further by transport costs, which
continued to give Indian producers an advantage in their home market until the 1860s
(Ellison, 1886: 63; Twomey, 1983).
It has been argued that the British cotton industry gained from protection
during the eighteenth century (O’Brien et al., 1991). However, once it is recognised
that the British cotton industry was innovating in response to a factor cost
disadvantage, this argument becomes much less persuasive. Indeed, it even becomes
possible to argue that protection in the domestic market was, if anything, likely to
delay the shift of competitive advantage, by removing the immediate pressure on
                                                                                                                                           
1 This view is perhaps most memorably summarised by the anonymous schoolboy’s answer to a
4domestic producers to innovate. In fact, it seems likely that the effects of protection
were neutral, since there is evidence that the Calico Acts were circumvented (Thomas,
[1926]).
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II we set out the quantitative
dimensions of the development of the industry in the two countries. We then examine
comparative wages and productivity in section III, showing the shift in competitive
advantage as productivity increased in Britain and stagnated in India. Section IV then
adds in raw cotton costs and shows how productivity and cost factors interacted to
bring about the growing dominance of the British cotton industry in world markets.
Section V re-examines the issue of high wages and labour saving technological
progress, including a section on the implications for protection. Section VI concludes.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH AND INDIAN COTTON TEXTILE
INDUSTRIES
1. The British cotton textile industry
There is widespread agreement that the arrival on a large scale of Indian cotton cloth
in Britain in the seventeenth century had a substantial effect on the domestic textile
industry. Indian patterns and designs quickly became fashionable and forced domestic
textile producers to react, on the one hand lobbying for protection, and on the other
hand imitating through printing on wool, linen and calico (Wadsworth and Mann,
1931: 118; Thomas, 1926: 25-66). It is significant, however, that there was no attempt
by domestic producers to imitate Indian labour-intensive production methods, which
could not have been economically viable at British wage rates.
                                                                                                                                           
question on the Industrial Revolution which began with the phrase “About 1760 a wave of gadgets
5In fact, the cotton industry was probably first introduced into Britain by
immigrants from the European continent, fleeing religious persecution. Baines [1835:
99] mentions Walloon and Dutch immigrants to East Anglia in the second half of the
sixteenth century. However, the cotton industry did not take permanent root there
(Wadsworth and Mann, 1931: 19-20). Rather, the industry took root in the already
established textile producing region of Lancashire at the beginning of the seventeenth
century, initially through the production of fustians, a combination of cotton weft and
linen warp (Wadsworth and Mann, 1931: 15; 527).
The British industry remained small throughout the seventeenth century and
the first half of the eighteenth century, since it was not yet competitive with Indian
cotton textiles. The output of the cotton industry is usually gauged from the
consumption of raw cotton, measured by retained imports (Deane and Cole, 1969:
185; Hoffman, 1965: 254-257; Farnie, 1979: 7). Table 1 shows that when figures
begin at the end of the seventeenth century, raw cotton consumption was only about 2
per cent of its volume at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, as late as the
1750s, cotton consumption was still less than 5 per cent of the level of the early
1800s.
The lack of competitiveness of the early British cotton textile industry can be
seen most clearly in the trade data of Tables 2 and 3. Trade data were collected by
customs officials on a value basis, but at “official” rather than current prices. These
official prices were set to reflect normal or typical prices ruling in 1694, with great
                                                                                                                                           
swept over England” (Ashton, 1948: 48).
6care being taken to eliminate temporary fluctuations (Schlote, 1952: 15). Although
much attention has been focused in the literature on how these official values provide
a misleading guide to current values of trade, particularly after the late eighteenth
century, this does not invalidate their use as indicators of trade volumes. Indeed,
Mitchell (1988: 446) quotes Flux (1899: 81) to the effect that “(t)he official values
appear to give a much better indication on the movements in the volume of trade than
one could have expected”. Certainly, the increase in the volume of both piece goods
and yarn exports during the first half of the nineteenth century shown in part B of
Table 2, moves broadly in line with the official values of exports in part A over the
same period. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, British cotton textile exports
were a mere 0.5 per cent of their level at the beginning of the nineteenth century. By
the 1750s, despite substantial growth, export volumes remained just 3 per cent of the
level of the early 1800s. In part A of Table 3, derived from the work of Davis (1954;
1962) on the regional breakdown of trade by commodity, the data on trade values at
official prices show how British cotton textile exports were a small fraction of the
imports of cotton cloth from India before the 1780s.
Worries about competition from India in the British market led to pressures for
protection. But it should be noted that the pressure for such measures came more from
producers of woollens and linens than from the small community of British cotton
textile producers, since fine woollens and linens were the closest substitutes for
printed cottons from India (Baines, 1835: 106). Initial measures from 1690 took the
form of import duties, but these were too low to make much impact on the huge
labour cost differences (Davis, 1966: 309). From 1701, however, printed calicoes and
certain other types of cotton cloth imported from India were prohibited (Wadsworth
7and Mann, 1931: 117-118). The 1701 Calico Act still allowed the importation of
white cottons from India for printing within Britain, until further legislation in 1721
prohibited these imports unless they were for re-export. O’Brien et al. (1991: 413-
418) see these protectionist measures, which remained in force with various
amendments until 1774, as giving an important boost to the British cotton industry.
However, if the British cotton industry is seen as innovating to overcome a labour
cost disadvantge, protection could be seen as reducing the incentive to innovate, and
therefore delaying the shift of competitive advantage. As we shall see later, such a
situation is broadly consistent with the experience of the United States in the
nineteenth century. However, in the case of Britain during the eighteenth century, it is
more likely that the protective measures were largely circumvented, as is apparent
from Chaudhuri’s (1978: 278) consideration of Indian exports to Britain.
By the mid-eighteenth century, Britain’s cotton producers were still not able to
compete seriously on world markets (Baines, 1835: 81). But the search for labour-
saving inventions, driven by the much higher wages in Britain than India, had already
begun by this time, and Timmins (1996: 34-39) lists developments in all the main
sections of preparation, spinning and weaving before the Industrial Revolution.
Worthy of note are Lewis Paul’s carding cylinder (1746), Lewis Paul’s spinning
machine (1738) and John Kay’s flying shuttle (1733). It is interesting to note that the
other major innovation before the Industrial Revolution was the Dutch or engine
loom, which originated from the other high wage centre of Europe (Timmins, 1996:
36-37). However, the crucial “macro inventions” of the Industrial Revolution period
had not yet appeared, since searching for any particular invention does not guarantee
that it will be found immediately (Mokyr, 1990; Crafts, 1977). Hence, whilst labour
8productivity in Britain was higher than in India, it was still not sufficiently high to
offset the higher wages. Indeed, since wages increased more rapidly in Lancashire
than in southern England during the eighteenth century, the Anglo-Indian wage gap in
cotton textiles increased substantially (Gilboy, 1934). This provides an example of a
general phenomenon of input prices being bid up by an increase in demand before
supply has responded fully.
During the second half of the eighteenth century, however, labour productivity
increased dramatically in the British cotton textile industry as a result of further
labour-saving technological progress, while technology and productivity stagnated in
India. This led to a shift in competitive advantage, so that by the early nineteenth
century, Britain was dominant in world markets, and even able to export to India.
Between 1780 and 1800, output grew at an annual rate of 10.8 per cent, while exports
expanded at an astonishing 14.0 per cent per annum. During the first half of the
nineteenth century, output continued to grow at an annual rate of 5.0 per cent, while
exports increased at a rate of 6.3 per cent per annum. However, Britain’s conquest of
world markets was hampered during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution
between the 1780s and the 1820s by he high price of inputs resulting from the sudden
surge in British demand. This applied most obviously in the labour market, where
shortages of handloom weavers famously led to very high earnings. However, it also
affected the price of raw cotton in Britain, which reached very high levels in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Mitchell, 1988: 759-760). However, as
supply increased, particularly from the United States, the price of raw cotton in
Britain fell back to the level of the early eighteenth century during the 1830s, and
Indian producers were faced with the full force of British competition.
9As current prices began to deviate substantially from official prices towards
the end of the late eighteenth century, Davis (1979) provided estimates of trade values
at current prices, shown here in part B of Table 3. These figures suggest that after the
repeal of the protective legislation, imports exceeded re-exports by a considerable
margin until the beginning of the nineteenth century. However, exports exceeded
imports already by the early 1790s.
British-made cottons first broke into the export trade in the African and
American markets during the eighteenth century, but success tended to be limited to
periods when the availability of Indian goods was restricted by war. Wadsworth and
Mann [1931: 159-160] show that Indian goods were still able to take market share
from the British-produced cottons in Africa when the disruption of the Seven Years
War ended in 1763. With the struggle over American independence adding to the
difficulties of Britain’s cotton exporters, it is perhaps fortunate that from the 1770s
technological developments made Britain competitive in Europe, finding a growing
market for what were called in the trade data “Manchester cottons and velverets”
(Wadsworth and Mann, 1931: 168-169). As Edwards (1967: 50) notes, the ability of
merchants and manufacturers to switch flexibly between the American and European
markets was important during the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
between 1793 and 1815. Not only was British trade with Europe frequently disrupted
by the fighting on the Continent during this extended period, but Britain also went to
war with the United States between 1812 and 1814. Inikori (2002: 444) shows that
Indian cottons continued to share the West African market equally with British-made
10
cottons during the second half of the eighteenth century, but that Lancashire goods
pulled ahead decisively after the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.
The penetration of British cotton textile exports into the Indian market
proceeded more slowly, however, since Indian producers retained a transport cost
advantage which they lacked in competition between the two countries in Africa,
America or Europe. To estimate Britain’s share of the Indian market, it is necessary to
make assumptions about cotton consumption in India, which in turn depend on
estimates of population and per capita consumption of cloth. Ellison [1886: 63]
assumes cotton consumption of 2½ lb per head of population, and population
estimates which are at the lower end of estimates surveyed by Visaria and Visaria,
(1983). This leads to the estimates of total cotton consumption in Table 4, which can
be married up with more reliable data on British exports to India to obtain upper
bound estimates of Britain’s market share. Ellison’s data suggest that Indian
producers supplied a larger share of their home market than British producers until at
least the 1860s. Twomey (1983: 46, 53) makes similar assumptions to estimate the
share of British exports in the Indian market as rising from 10 per cent in 1850 to a
peak of 60 per cent in 1880-84 before falling back to 50 per cent by 1910-14.
2. The cotton textile industry in India
Before the dramatic rise of Lancashire in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, the world’s most important cotton textile industry was located in India
(Robson, 1957: 1). Chaudhuri (1978: 238) argues that India’s competitiveness in this
industry can be explained by an abundant supply of skilled labour, with specialised
tacit knowledge being passed down through the generations in classic Marshallian
11
fashion.2 Occupations related to the production of particular types of textiles were
caste-based and led to regional specialisation. Raw cotton was available locally and
regional varieties often had a crucial impact on the type of cloth produced. Although
spinning and weaving activities were widely dispersed throughout the country,
regional specialisation was a key aspect of the Indian cotton textile industry. Coarse
cloth was produced for the local market and was spread across all regions. Fine cloth
was produced for interregional and international markets, mainly in the four regions
of Gujarat, the Punjab, the Coromandel Coast and Bengal (Chaudhuri, 1978: 243).
The Gujarat cotton industry exported largely to the Red Sea ports, while
exports from the Punjab went overland to Afghanistan, East Persia and Central Asia
and by river and sea to the Persian Gulf (Chaudhuri, 1978: 243-245). Before the
growth of the European trade, the Coromandel industry exported mainly to south-east
Asia, while Bengal supplied upper India. From the seventeenth century, substantial
quantities of Indian cotton cloth were exported to Europe, particularly through the
English East India Company (EIC) and the Dutch United East India Company
(Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC). The European companies set up
trading posts along the coast and encouraged the settlement of weavers. This was
particularly true of the Coromandel Coast in the south of India (Ramaswamy 1985:
120-121). In Bengal, textile production was primarily a domestic rural industry.
Although there were urban centres of production, weavers showed much less mobility
than in the Coromandel (Chaudhury 1995: 158).
                                                
2 Marshall [1920: 225] famously noted that “The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as
it were in the air.”
12
Part A of Table 5 shows the number of textile pieces exported to Britain
between the 1660s and 1750s by the EIC from Bombay (the Gujarat trade), Madras
(the Coromandel Coast trade) and Bengal, together with the data on textile exports to
Europe via the VOC. Although the textile data include small amounts of silk goods
and mixtures of silk and cotton, they are dominated by cotton cloth. Total textile
exports from these three key centres of the Indian cotton textile trade to Britain show
a strong upward trend from the 1660s to the 1680s, followed by a sharp downturn due
to political conflict and war with the Mughal Empire. A second downturn in the first
decade of the eighteenth century can be explained by the introduction of measures to
protect British textile producers, together with bullion shortage and war (Chaudhuri,
1978: 295). However, ways were found around the protective measures and Indian
textile exports to Britain fluctuated around 600,000 to 800,000 pieces for the rest of
the first half of the eighteenth century. Part B of Table 5 picks up the story from the
1770s to the 1790s, but with the Gujarat trade passing through Surat rather than
Bombay. Note that Indian exports to Britain continued to thrive during this period.
Note, however, that the regional balance of the Indian export trade to Britain
changed substantially between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Whereas
Bombay and Madras were clearly more important during the seventeenth century,
Bengal became the dominant supplier of textiles to the EIC during the eighteenth
century. The declining importance of the Coromandel Coast as a supplier partly
reflected the disruption caused by political conflict, particularly during the Mughal-
Maratha wars (Arasaratnam, 1986: 153). However, Chaudhuri (1978: 296) also notes
a relative cheapening of Bengal cottons, which suggests that the shift in competitive
advantage between India and Britain was foreshadowed by a regional shift in
13
competitive advantage within India. Exports via the VOC were generally lower than
via the EIC, and exports by the French and Danish companies were lower again
(Morineau, 1999: 252, 266).
Table 6, taken from Twomey (1983), shows Indian cotton textile exports
during the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century. The
figures for Bengal in the 1790s match well with the figures from Table 5, although the
higher figures for total India suggest that the three centres account for only about half
the trade. Table 6 suggest that there was a sharp decline in Indian cotton textile
exports to the British market only from the 1790s, which accords with the pattern of
British imports in Table 3. Note, however, that the decline in total Indian exports to
all markets was substantially slower.
3. Textile prices and the world market
Our explanation of the shift in competitive advantage relies on the existence of an
integrated world market in cotton textiles. Although transport costs provided local
producers with a limited amount of shelter from international competition in local
markets, even with a relatively light product such as cloth, competitive forces also
clearly stopped local prices from getting too far out of line with world market prices.
This was much less true of grain prices in the early modern period, since grain was
much more expensive to transport on account of its high weight-to-value ratio
(Broadberry and Gupta, 2006).
Textile prices and grain prices for England during the period 1500-1850 are
shown in Figure 1, based on Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1981: 44-59). The relative
14
price of textiles clearly trended downwards over the period as a whole, as agricultural
prices increased more rapidly than textile prices. Note that English textile prices
showed no trend increase or decrease in nominal terms during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, which amounted to a substantial real price decline (Shammas,
1994). This is the context in which we need to assess what was happening to textile
prices in India, with prices on world markets setting limits to the prices that could be
paid to Indian producers. As already noted in the discussion of lobbying for protection
in Britain, there was a clear appreciation amongst textile producers of competition
between types of cloth, with fine woollens and linens seen as close substitutes for
printed cottons (Baines, 1835: 106). Hence the Indian export prices charted in Figure
2 for the period 1665-1759 show little upward trend. However, they also indicate a
fairly constant differential between the higher prices in Madras and Bengal than in
Bombay, reflecting differences in the type of cloth produced in the different regions.
VOC records show that prices of textile products that had a large share in exports to
Europe did rise in response to the gap between demand and supply from the mid-
seventeenth century to the early years of the eighteenth century (Prakash 1985: 237).
However, the constraint imposed by the price that could be obtained on the English
market after 1760 is illustrated by the fact that the East India Company’s offer price to
the weavers in Bengal at times fell short of the weavers’ cost-determined asking price,
so that supply to the EIC fell short of demand (Hossain, 1988: 55).
It seems likely that, against this generally competitive background, the EIC
enjoyed monopsony power in at least some regions of India in some periods, due to
the scale of its operations. Nevertheless, the general framework of analysis is one of
international competition within an integrated world market for cotton textiles. As
15
technological progress in Britain put downward pressure on cotton textile prices,
Indian producers found it increasingly difficult to compete, and competitive
advantage in cotton textiles shifted from India to Britain. As Mitra (1978: 193) put it,
“In 1818, the Dacca factory was closed down. It was not the freight, nor the protective
duty which prompted the Court to abandon it in 1818, but the sharp reduction in
prices of English cotton goods of a similar description and the fine piece-goods of
Bengal increasingly lost their market.”
III. WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY IN INDIA AND LANCASHIRE
1. Anglo-Indian wage differences in cotton textiles
The cotton textile industry adds value to raw cotton, using labour intensive production
processes. Hence competitiveness on world cotton textile markets depends largely on
comparative unit labour costs, given by the ratio of comparative money wages
measured in a common currency and comparative labour productivity in volume
terms. In this section we compare the wages of cotton textile workers in Lancashire
and India. Chaudhuri (1978: 237) notes the views of an anonymous author writing in
1701 that the same amount of labour as would cost a shilling in England may be had
for two pence in India. To what extent did this six-to-one wage differential exist in
cotton textile production, and how did it vary over time?
Broadberry and Gupta (2006) show that the money wages of unskilled and
skilled labourers in India were already much lower than in Britain by the end of the
sixteenth century, when compared at prevailing exchange rates. Since currencies at
this time can be compared on the basis of their silver content, this is labelled the silver
wage. Although the silver wage was much higher in Britain than in India, providing
16
greater command over tradable goods, it should be noted that the price of non-tradable
goods was also much higher in Britain. Hence, differences in the grain wage, defined
as the silver wage divided by the price of grain, the principal foodstuff, were much
smaller. Differences in living standards (or real consumption wages) lie somewhere
between the limits set by silver wage differences and grain wage differences.
Table 7 presents a comparison of earnings in the cotton industry between 1680
and 1820. The Indian earnings are collected from a variety of sources for the
Coromandel and Bengal. Data for the early period are taken from several studies of
the handloom industry in southeastern India, while data for the later period are mainly
from Bengal. This is in line with the regional shift of production for export discussed
earlier. The Lancashire earnings for 1770 are taken from the authorative study of
Wadsworth and Mann [1931], and derive originally from the work of Arthur Young,
based on the weekly earnings of a handloom weaver operating a single loom, with
some assistance from his wife and children.3 The Indian data for 1770 are derived
from an estimate of the monthly earnings of a loom operated by two men with the
assistance of their wives and children.4 These data put the Lancashire wage at 600 per
cent of the Indian wage, consistent with the six-to-one differential noted by
Chaudhuri’s (1978: 237) anonymous tract author.
Working back from 1770, we take the 1680 figure for India from Brennig’s
(1986) study of the Coromandel textile trade in the late seventeenth century. The
weekly data are derived as one quarter of the estimated monthly earnings of a master
weaver operating a single loom with the help of an assistant. The weaver would also
                                                
3 These figures for the earnings of English weavers are also used by Parthasarathi (1998: 83-84).
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have been assisted in ancillary tasks by his wife. For Lancashire, we have used
Gilboy’s (1934) estimate of the daily wage of a craftsman, assuming a six-day week.
Working forward from 1770, we take the earnings in Lancashire for circa
1790 from Gilboy (1934: 280-287). The figure used here is for skilled workers. Wood
(1910) suggests even higher earnings for handloom weavers during the late 1790s,
due to a substantial imbalance between the spinning and weaving sections of the
industry at this time, following a number of dramatic improvements in spinning
technology but before the successful introduction of the powerloom. However, Gilboy
(1934) suggests a substantial increase in earnings during the course of the 1790s, and
spinners’ earnings were substantially lower. Since the wages of handloom weavers
increased much more slowly in India, the English wage as a proportion of the Indian
wage increased. For 1820, the Lancashire earnings data are taken from Wood (1910:
127) and refer to all cotton operatives, including factory workers as well as handloom
weavers. With handloom weaving now being threatened by factory production, and
with a general rebalancing of supply and demand in the labour market, English wages
fell back in cotton textiles.5 Mitra (1978: 128-129) shows that the wages of Indian
cotton spinners  remained constant in money terms between 1790 and 1820, so that
the English wage fell back to 517 per cent of the Indian level.
2. Anglo-Indian productivity differences in cotton textiles
Direct estimates of the level of labour productivity in cotton textile production for
both England and India during the crucial Industrial Revolution period are scarce.
                                                                                                                                           
4 Since all earnings are attributed to male weavers rather than allocated between weavers and other
family members, the true wage of an individual weaver is, if anything, overstated in these sources.
5 Money wages also fell in line with prices in England during the postwar deflation (Gayer et al., 1953:
818).
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Nevertheless, there is sufficient information to shed quantitative light on the changing
balance between Anglo-Indian wage and productivity differences, and hence in
comparative unit labour costs. We focus first on comparative levels of labour
productivity around 1770 and then turn to establishing trends over time.
Dealing first with comparative levels of labour productivity in spinning,
Catling (1970: 54) provides data on English labour productivity for spinning 80s
cotton yarn, using the concept of OHP, or operative hours needed to process 100 lb of
cotton, which is just the inverse of labour productivity. This takes account of the
effects of the increasing speed of the newer mules, the increasing number of spindles
per mule and the later practice of operating the mules as pairs. If a machine is tended
by three operatives and has an output of 25 lb per hour, then the OHP is 12. In Table
8, the OHP requirement for 80s yarn around 1780 was 2,000. For India, Catling
suggests a rough estimate of 50,000 for the Indian OHP around 1780, which would
give Britain a huge labour productivity advantage. For coarser counts, however,
Buchanan Hamilton (1833: 289) suggests that a woman spinner working full-time
could clean and spin two-and-a-half pounds of cotton in a month. Assuming a ten
hour working day and a six day week, that would translate into around 100 hours to
process a pound of cotton, or an OHP of 10,000. These figures would also suggest a
substantial British labour productivity advantage in spinning.
In weaving, it seems likely that the British labour productivity advantage
around 1770 was smaller than in spinning, since technological progress was more
limited in weaving before the introduction of the power loom. There are, nevertheless,
clear suggestions in the literature of a higher capital-labour ratio in Lancashire than in
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India. In Coromandel weaving, Brennig (1986: 348) for the late seventeenth century
and Arasnaratnam (1980: 269) for the late eighteenth century, indicate two full-time
male operatives per handloom, in addition to ancillary labour inputs from family
members. Mitra (1978: 113-115) also presents evidence to suggest that two men
worked per loom in late eighteenth century Bengal. In the Patna region of the Bengal
Presidency, Sinha (1984: 26-27) finds three weavers per loom towards the end of the
eighteenth century. A similar capital-labour ratio is also suggested by Buchanan
Hamilton (1833: 296) and Hossain (1988: 40-41). Prakash (1985: 241) reports
estimates of one-and-a-half to two persons per loom for Bengal, which he regards as a
conservative figure. Typically, three men worked per loom for finer textiles with
design and two per loom for coarser textiles. Baines [1835: 71] suggests that three
men were employed in the weaving of Muslin in Bengal. Hossain (1979: 325) claims
that for fine jamdani fabric two weavers laid the warp, one was involved in weaving,
two to make floral designs and another one to tie the threads of the design.
Descriptions of Indian weaving equipment by contemporary writers suggest
the use of rudimentary technology, such as a warp set up on four bamboo sticks by
two men on open ground and then fixed to the loom. It took these two men ten to
thirty days to lay the warp (Hossain 1988: 40). One of these men held by hand two
small wheels around which the thread was wound as he laid the warp. The loom was
placed in a pit inside a weaving shed. The weaver sat on the side and operated the
loom (Taylor, 1840: 174-175). Simple, though numerous, tools were used in spinning
and weaving. These tools were made of locally available materials such as bamboo,
reed, wood and wire (Hossain, 1988: 48). While the technology remained stagnant, it
is likely that Indian productivity was nevertheless high by pre-industrial standards,
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due to the extent of the division of labour, where each task was performed by a certain
social group. The spinning and embroidery were done by the women, washing and
dyeing by specific caste groups.
Estimates of weavers’ fixed costs confirm that the technology used was highly
labour intensive. Buchanan Hamilton’s (1833: 298) survey put the cost of a loom at
two-and-a-half Rupees, less than a weaver’s monthly earnings. The cost of a weaving
shop or shed was put at 4 Rupees and accessories at less than a quarter of a Rupee.
The cost of yarn for two pieces of cloth, at 5 Rupees, was the main part of the
production cost. Hossain’s (1988: 20) work on eastern Bengal in the eighteenth
century echoes this view, arguing that the capital input was minimal, with output
being increased by drawing in surplus labour. Technology in the Indian textile
industry changed little over the centuries when Indian producers dominated the world
market (Habib, 1980; Prakash, 1985: 236-237).
Although Wadsworth and Mann [1931: 324-339] also indicate ancillary labour
inputs from family members in the Lancashire industry during the first half of the
eighteenth century, each loom was operated by only one full-time male weaver. This
suggests that before the major technological changes of the second half of the
eighteenth century, the Indian industry started out with two to three times as much
labour per handloom as the English industry. If we assume that English and Indian
looms were capable of producing the same output, this would result in a two-to-one or
three-to-one labour productivity advantage for England over India. This would be
consistent with Lancashire being unable to compete seriously on world markets at the
beginning of the eighteenth century, since wages were four times higher than in India.
21
It would also be consistent with Lancashire being able to draw on the technological
change that had occurred in the European cotton industry and in textile manufacturing
in general during the late medieval and early modern periods (Mazzaoui, 1981: 73-
86).
Turning now to trends in comparative labour productivity over time, there are
clear signs of labour saving technological progress in the Lancashire cotton industry
during the eighteenth century, particularly in cotton spinning. The key technological
breakthrough in spinning came at the end of the 1770s. Crompton’s mule, introduced
in 1779, combined innovations from Hargreaves’ spinning jenny, introduced in 1764
and patented in 1770, and Arkwright’s water frame, patented in 1769 (Timmins,
1996: 40-43). While mules remained hand-driven, they were limited in size to around
100 spindles, setting limits to the increase in labour productivity over the older single-
spindle jersey wheel technology. However, once power was applied, the capacity of a
single mule increased to upwards of 1,200 spindles by the early 1830s (Timmins,
1996: 43).
Technological progress in spinning led to a sharp fall in the relative price of
cotton yarn from the first half of the 1780s. However, as can be seen in Table 9, the
real price fall was greater in the higher counts, with mechanisation making the
spinning of very fine yarns in England an economic proposition for the first time
(Harley, 1998: 50). On the coarse counts that dominated the trade at this time, such as
18s weft, real prices fell by a factor of about four between the first half of the 1780s
and the first half of the 1820s. On finer counts such as 40s warp, the real price fell by
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a factor of nearly 8, and on very fine counts such as 100s twist, it fell by a factor of
15.
However, spinning was only one task in the preparation of finished cotton
cloth, and technological progress was much less dramatic in other parts of the
industry, including preparation and finishing as well as weaving. In weaving, although
machinery was being continually improved, there were no major technological
breakthroughs between Kay’s flying shuttle, patented in 1733, and the successful
application of power to the loom, which was a long drawn-out affair from the 1770s.
The development of an economic powerloom proved a daunting technological
challenge, and was only really achieved on a commercial basis by Sharp and Roberts
in 1822 (Timmins, 1996: 46). This imbalance between spinning and weaving helped
to generate the high wages of handloom weavers in the late eighteenth century
apparent in Table 7. Given the less rapid technological progress in weaving than in
spinning, we should expect the real price of cotton cloth to decline more slowly than
the real price of yarn, and this is borne out by Table 9. The real price of calico fell by
less than a factor of 4 between 1780/4 and 1820/4, while the real price of muslin fell
by less than a factor of 3.
Since labour was not the only input, we need to demonstrate that real prices
declined in line with increasing labour productivity before the former can be used as
an indicator of the latter. We see that the fall in the real price of 100s yarn in Table 9
is very close to the increase in labour productivity for 80s yarn in Table 8. Both are
very fine counts for this period, so the high measure of agreement is reassuring. We
have taken the fall in the real price of cloth, the final product, as the best guide to the
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increase in productivity in the cotton industry as a whole. Cuenca Esteban (1994: 101-
102) suggests a fall in the nominal price of cotton textile exports by a factor of 4.65
between 1770/4 and 1820/4, which translates into a fall in the real price by a factor of
6.53.
3. Unit labour costs
Now consider the implications for competitiveness between Lancashire and India in
Table 10. Competitiveness is measured here by comparative unit labour costs
(ULC/ULC*):
*y/y
*eW/W
*ULC
ULC
 (1)
where an asterisk denotes the numeraire country, in this case Britain. Comparative
unit labour costs are calculated as the ratio between comparative money wages
converted to a common currency and comparative labour productivity (y/y*). Money
wages in India (W) and Britain (W*) are converted to a common currency using the
exchange rate, determined by relative silver content (e).
In 1770, wages in Britain were about 6 time higher than in India, but labour
productivity in Britain was only between two and three times higher than in India.
This meant that the ratio of comparative silver wages to comparative labour
productivity, or comparative unit labour costs, took a value well above 100. With
much higher unit labour costs than in India, Britain had a substantial competitive
disadvantage in world markets. By 1820, however, with productivity having increased
in Britain by a factor of 6.53 and with the assumption of stagnation in India,
productivity in Britain had risen to 1625 per cent of the Indian level. Since British
24
wages had by this time fallen back to around 517 per cent of the Indian level, unit
labour costs were now lower in Britain than in India, and Britain had the competitive
edge in world markets.
IV. COMPARATIVE COSTS, PRICES AND CHANGING MARKET SHARES
1. Raw cotton costs
We see the shift in competitive advantage in cotton textiles from India to Britain as
driven primarily by changing comparative unit labour costs. However, it is helpful
also to take into account differences in raw cotton costs. Table 11 shows that the price
of raw cotton in Britain averaged about 7 old pence per lb in both the late seventeenth
century and the mid-nineteenth century. However, from the mid-eighteenth century to
the early nineteenth century, the price of raw cotton in Britain increased substantially,
in response to the sharp increase in demand and before supply had responded fully.
In Table 12, we see that India, with its local supply, faced a raw cotton price
that was generally cheaper than in Britain, which gave India a further competitive
edge over and above the lower wage costs. But what is interesting to note is that
whereas raw cotton prices followed a sharply upward trend in Britain after 1740, the
increase was much more gradual in India. Of particular significance was the sharp rise
in raw cotton costs in Britain during the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars. What Table 11 and 12 suggest is that relative raw cotton costs played an
important role in the timing of the shift in competitive advantage. For just as the
British cotton industry began to experience dramatic productivity growth in the late
eighteenth century that could offset the high wages, raw cotton costs rose rapidly to
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delay the shift in competitive advantage.6 As raw cotton prices fell back after the end
of the Napoleonic Wars, the effects of the productivity growth were realised and
Lancashire cottons replaced Indian cottons in world markets.
2. Comparative costs and prices
Table 13 shows comparative GB/India combined costs as a weighted average of wage
and raw cotton costs. The weights are based on Jones (1933: 105) and Edwards (1967:
240), together with the assumption that the Anglo-Indian other costs ratio was the
same as the raw cotton costs ratio. It is tempting to think that this combined cost ratio
reflects the comparative total factor productivity ratio (A/A*), since the levels
equivalent of the familiar cost dual TFP equation is:
*)/(
*)/(*)/(*/
1
PP
CCWWAA
 
 (2)
where A is total factor productivity (TFP), W is the wage rate, C is the cost of raw
cotton, and P is the price of cotton yarn or cloth. An asterisk indicates the foreign
country, which is taken as India. In competitive markets, the selling price must be
equal, so it is tempting to think that the denominator in equation (2) should be unity.
However, it is important to note that the correct prices to use in the
denominator here are prices free on board (FOB), whereas the selling prices (SP)
include transport costs (T):
SP = P + T (3)
In Table 13, we assume that the initial FOB price ratio was 200, obtained from
Chaudhuri’s (1978: 540-548) information on the East India Company mark-up on
                                                
6 It is possible that a small part of the increase in the price of raw cotton during the Napoleonic War
period reflects an increase in quality, with the growing importance of supplies from the United States.
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Indian textiles. This has been extended forwards from 1770 using the British cotton
textile export price index from Cuenca Esteban (1994: 101-102), together with the
assumption of stagnant FOB prices in India. Evidence in favour of this latter
assumption is provided by Mitra (1978: 103-130), who notes that the EIC increasingly
ran into difficulties in fulfilling its orders for cotton cloth in India, yet was unable to
offer higher prices because of the situation in the English market. Given these
developments in combined costs and FOB prices on a comparative basis, we see in
Table 13 that Britain’s TFP advantage increased continually throughout the period.
The change in competitive advantage in the production of cotton textiles
occurred in three stages. In the first stage, which extended until the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, the selling price of Indian goods in the British market (SP*) was
lower than the British FOB price (P) for most products, which were therefore not
produced in Britain. In this stage, the British industry focused largely on the
production of fustians.
In the second stage, towards the turn of the century, competitive advantage
had started to shift in Britain’s favour. With rising productivity in Lancashire, the
FOB price in England now fell below the CIF price of Indian goods in Britain for a
growing range of products, so that Britain increasingly displaced India from the home
market. Also, Britain became increasingly able to compete against India in third
markets such as Africa, where transport costs were similar for both countries.
                                                                                                                                           
However, the increasing price is also visible in cotton imports from other areas.
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In the third stage, from about 1830, the productivity gains in Britain,
particularly now in weaving, reduced the British FOB price still further, so that the
British selling price in the Indian market, inclusive of transport costs, could fall below
the Indian FOB price in at least some products. We have already seen in Table 4 how
Britain’s share of the Indian market grew from 3.9 per cent in 1831-35 to 58.4 per
cent in 1880-81. This view of the dynamics of Britain’s penetration of the Indian
market during the nineteenth century, based on the work of Ellison [1886] is broadly
consistent with the picture presented by Twomey (1983), who is interested in the issue
of Indian de-industrialisation. Twomey (1983: 40, 53) argues that although India
became a net importer of cotton cloth from about 1830, handicraft production for the
home market turned down only after 1850.
V. HIGH WAGES AND LABOUR SAVING TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
1. Wages and induced innovation
The idea of a link between high wages and labour saving technological progress was
originally proposed by Hicks (1932: 125). Although Salter (1960: 43) criticised
Hicks’s argument on the theoretical grounds that “(t)he entrepreneur is interested in
reducing costs in total, not particular costs such as labour costs or capital costs”, the
idea has persisted in recent work, particularly where there are large differences
between countries in factor prices and productivity (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001). In
the historical literature, this approach is most closely associated with the work of
Habakkuk (1962). However, Habakkuk’s focus was on the case of the United States
and Britain during the nineteenth century, with Britain cast in the role of the low wage
economy, and high wages inducing labour saving technological progress in the United
States.
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Economic historians have been reluctant to apply this approach to the case of
the Industrial Revolution, with Britain cast in the role of the high wage producer. Von
Tunzelmann (1981: 159-160), for example, endorses Habakkuk’s view of the US/UK
case, but explicitly rejects its applicability to the case of Britain and Europe during the
Industrial Revolution. This reluctance to characterise Britain as a high wage economy
during the Industrial Revolution probably owes it origins to the long running standard
of living debate, which emphasises the slowness of real wages to rise for the working
class. For example, von Tunzelmann (1995: 6-7) notes that “With the current
orthodoxy of the standard-of-living debate being that wages in England did not begin
to rise appreciably in real terms until the second or third decades of the nineteenth
century, and even then not very rapidly, there was little in the way of a renewed
incentive to economize upon labor”. However, this is quite consistent with the
findings emphasised in Broadberry and Gupta (2006), that whilst silver wages were
much higher in northwest Europe than in Asia, grain wages were not. Since the price
of grain was also relatively cheap in India, workers’ living standards were not as low
as suggested by the fact that Indian silver wages were only 20 per cent of the British
level. However, British firms competing with Indian producers had to think in terms
of the silver wage, since they had to sell on world markets at the world silver price.
Griffiths et al. (1992: 892) find that 42.8 per cent of all innovations in the
British textile industry during the eighteenth century could be assigned to the category
“factor saving”, with the bulk of the rest of the innovations being assigned to various
categories of product rather than process innovation. However, Griffiths et al. (1998)
take the argument a step further, claiming that there is little support for the idea of
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induced innovation, at least as it has been conventionally presented in the cotton
textile industry during the Industrial Revolution, in terms of a sequence of challenges
and responses. But one way of interpreting the difficulty that they find in identifying a
simple pattern of bunching in patenting activity around particular stages of production
at particular times is to follow David (1975) in assigning a key role to factor prices in
initially pushing the high wage economy on to a more capital-intensive point on the
available process frontier, with subsequent technological progress driven by “local
learning”. In this kind of trial and error process, technological progress tends to
preserve initial factor proportions, but we need not expect all inventors to specifically
mention factor saving as a driving force behind their particular innovations, and in a
stochastic environment there are likely to be variable delays between challenge and
response.
Since silver wages were four times higher in Britain than in India, it is not
surprising that British producers seeking to imitate Indian cotton textiles could not
adopt labour intensive Indian production methods. Rather, British producers needed to
find new production methods, and it is this search which led them to the innovations
of the Industrial Revolution. The scale of this Anglo-Indian silver wage difference
prompts us to put it at the heart of the developments in cotton, and hence at the heart
of the Industrial Revolution. Some writers have considered the logical possibility, but
without perceiving the huge silver wage gap, have resisted giving it anything other
than a minor role. Thus Landes (1969: 115-116) devotes one paragraph to high wages
as a stimulus to mechanisation, but makes no mention of the inducement mechanism
in his later work (Landes, 1998). Others, such as Deane (1965: 97), only mention
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wages and the British cotton industry to stress the importance of “an almost
inexhaustible low-priced labour supply”.
In our view, it is the combination of the focus on Europe rather than Asia
together with the consideration of grain wages rather than silver wages that accounts
for the previous neglect of the link between the Anglo-Indian wage gap and labour-
saving technological progress in the British cotton industry. Thus although
Parthasarathi (2001) makes a direct comparison between Britain and India, he focuses
on the grain wage and hence follows other “world historians” in minimising the
differences between Europe and Asia during the early modern period (Frank, 1998;
Pomeranz, 2000).
2. Biased technological change
Before we conclude in favour of labour-saving technological progress, however, we
must confront another strand in the literature, which emphasises the slow growth of
capital during the Industrial Revolution, combined with the rapid growth of labour as
population growth increased. Von Tunzelmann (1994: 289-290) claims that
technological progress in the economy as a whole was only strongly labour saving
after 1830. The data which underpin this conclusion are reproduced here in Table 14.
Working at the level of the economy as a whole, although total net fixed capital stock
per head of population did increase before 1830 at an annual rate of 0.2 per cent, this
rose to 1.5 per cent after 1830. However, as Williamson (1990: 272) notes, the
apparent modesty of Britain’s investment requirement during the Industrial
Revolution had much to do with under-investment in dwellings and social overhead
capital rather than in plant, equipment and machinery, which is of most relevance to
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labour saving technological progress. Indeed, plant, equipment and machinery per
head was already increasing at an annual rate of 0.8 per cent between 1760 and 1830,
rising to 2.2 per cent after 1830.
Disaggregated data by industry are more patchy, and for cotton textiles, we
have only the capital stock data of Chapman and Butt (1988), which refer largely to
buildings. Nevertheless, there is evidence of an increasing capital labour ratio before
1830 as well as after, and this is consistent with labour saving technological progress
in the cotton textile industry.
3. Implications for protection
As noted earlier, it has been argued by O’Brien et al. (1991) that the British cotton
industry gained from protection during the eighteenth century. However, once it is
recognised that the British cotton industry was innovating in response to a factor cost
disadvantage, this argument becomes much less persuasive. Indeed, within the
induced innovation framework, it even becomes possible to argue that protection in
the domestic market, if anything, delayed the shift of competitive advantage, by
removing the immediate pressure on domestic producers to innovate.
Wadsworth and Mann [1931: 118, 128] play down the significance of the
Calico Acts for cotton, since linen could also be used for printing, and import barriers
could anyway do nothing to offset India’s competitive advantage in export markets.
Furthermore, as Chaudhuri (1978: 278) notes, a consideration of Indian exports to
Britain suggests that the measures must have been circumvented even in the British
market. Part A of Table 3 certainly shows continued growth of the volume of imports
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from India during the eighteenth century, although the broad equality of re-exports
and imports until the repeal of the protective legislation in 1774 suggests that the East
India Company at least paid lip-service to the principle that this cloth should not reach
the British consumer. Thomas [1926: 135-137] cites legal documents from
prosecutions as well as allegations by contemporaries to implicate the East India
Company in smuggling, but the scale of such operations remains difficult to ascertain.
In practice, then, it seems likely that the effects of protection on the British
cotton industry were neutral, with the Calico Acts being circumvented. Note,
however, that there is an example from the nineteenth century of a high wage cotton
textile producer sheltering behind tariff barriers and failing to become competitive in
world markets. The United States adopted very high tariffs during the nineteenth
century, securing a large share of the domestic market, particularly in lower quality
coarse goods (Harley, 2001). As noted earlier, high wages in manufacturing in the
United States are often seen as inducing labour saving technological progress
(Habakkuk, 1962; David, 1975). In the case of cotton textiles, this led to the
widespread adoption of the high-throughput technologies of ring spinning and the
automatic loom (Jones, 1933; Sandberg, 1974; Lazonick, 1986). However, the US
cotton industry never became competitive on world markets for any sustained period,
since the wage cost disadvantage always outweighed any labour productivity
advantage (Saxonhouse and Wright, 1987; Broadberry and Marrison, 2002). Had the
Calico Acts succeeded, it is possible that the British cotton industry, like its American
counterpart, would never have become competitive in world markets.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The shift of competitive advantage in cotton textiles from India to Lancashire was a
key episode in the Great Divergence of living standards between Europe and Asia.
This paper offers a new perspective on this major development, centred on
comparative unit labour costs, and emphasising the interactions between the two
countries. We emphasise the growing imports of cotton cloth from India via the East
India Company during the seventeenth century, which opened up new opportunities
for import substitution as the new cloths, patterns and designs became increasingly
fashionable. However, high silver wages in Britain as a result of high productivity in
other tradable goods and services, meant that British producers of cotton textiles
could not use labour-intensive Indian production methods. This stimulated a search
for new methods of production that economised on the use of labour. As labour
productivity increased in Britain and stagnated in India, comparative unit labour costs
moved in Britain’s favour. Had protection of the domestic market succeeded, this may
have removed the spur to innovation provided by the high wages compared to India,
thus delaying the shift of competitive advantage.
The shift of competitive advantage occurred in three stages. First, a small
cotton industry was established in Lancashire between 1600 and 1770. Although
labour productivity was higher than in India, wages were even higher so that
Lancashire was unable to compete seriously with India. Second, between 1770 and
1830 labour saving technological progress raised labour productivity and made
Lancashire competitive in world markets despite high wages. During this second
phase, the shift of competitive advantage in international markets was delayed by
rising wage and raw cotton costs, before supply responded fully to the increased
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demand in factor and material input markets. Third, after 1830, further technological
progress made Lancashire competitive even in the Indian market.
35
TABLE 1: Raw cotton consumption, Great Britain 1697-1849 (million lb)
Annual
average
consumption
Annual
average
consumption
1697-99 1.1 1770-79 4.8
1700-09 1.1 1780-89 15.5
1710-19 1.3 1790-99 28.6
1720-29 1.5 1800-09 59.6
1730-39 1.7 1810-19 93.4
1740-49 2.1 1820-29 166.5
1750-59 2.8 1830-39 320.7
1760-69 3.5 1840-49 526.3
Sources: 1697-1780: Wadsworth and Mann [1931: Appendix G]; 1780-1810: Baines
[1835: 347]; 1810-1849: Ellison [1886: Table 1].
TABLE 2: Exports of cotton textiles, measured at constant official prices, Great
Britain, 1697-1850 (£000 at 1697 prices)
A. Values at constant official prices (£000 at 1697 prices)
Total Piece
goods
Yarn Total
1697-99 16 1770-79 246
1700-09 13 1780-89 756
1710-19 8 1790-99 2,525 101 2,626
1720-29 16 1800-09 7,603 749 8,352
1730-39 14 1810-19 17,712 1,133 18,845
1740-49 11 1820-29 25,605 3,225 29,830
1750-59 86 1830-39 44,086 7,519 51,605
1760-69 227 1840-49 73,838 12,109 85,947
B. Volumes
Piece goods Yarn
m lin yds m lb m lb
1800-09 109.5 20.0 7.4
1810-19 205.0 37.4 12.0
1820-29 320.3 58.5 35.5
1830-39 552.4 100.8 84.3
1840-49 977.5 178.4 136.1
Sources: Part A: 1697-1808: Schumpeter (1960: Tables X, XI); 1808-1850:
Parliamentary Papers (various years), Finance Accounts: Trade and Navigation.
Part B: Robson (1957: 331).
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TABLE 3: British imports and re-exports of cotton piece goods from India,
compared with British exports of cotton textiles, 1663-1856
A. Values at constant official prices (£000 at 1697 prices)
Imports Re-exports Exports
1663-69 182
1699-1701 367 340 20
1722-24 437 484 18
1752-54 401 499 83
1772-74 697 701 221
B. Values at current prices (£000)
Imports Re-exports Exports
1784-86 1,344 395 797
1794-96 1,687 1,148 3,801
1804-06 823 777 16,339
1814-16 515 433 18,994
1824-26 363 430 17,375
1834-36 347 406 22,398
1844-46 478 450 25,835
1854-56 481 532 34,908
Sources: Part A: 1663-1701: Davis (1954: 164-165); 1722-1774: Davis (1962: 300-
303). Part B: 1784-1856: Davis (1979: 94-125).
TABLE 4: British cotton textile exports in the Indian market, 1831-35 to 1880-81
Indian consumption of
cotton textiles (m lb)
Share taken by
British exports (%)
1831-35 375 3.9
1856-60 455 35.3
1880-81 600 58.4
Source: Ellison [1886: 63].
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TABLE 5: Indian exports of textiles to Europe (pieces per year)
A. 1665-1759
To Britain via EIC from: To Europe
Bengal Madras Bombay Three
centres
via VOC
1665-69 7,041 37,078 95,558 139,677 126,572
1670-74 46,510 169,052 294,959 510,521 257,918
1675-79 66,764 193,303 309,480 569,547 127,459
1680-84 107,669 408,032 452,083 967,784 283,456
1685-89 169,595 244,065 200,766 614,426 316,167
1690-94 59,390 23,011 89,486 171,887 156,891
1695-99 130,910 107,909 148,704 387,523 364,613
1700-04 197,012 104,939 296,027 597,978 310,611
1705-09 70,594 99,038 34,382 204,014 294,886
1710-14 260,318 150,042 164,742 575,102 372,601
1715-19 251,585 200,495 82,108 534,188 435,923
1720-24 341,925 269,653 184,715 796,293 475,752
1725-29 558,850 142,500 119,962 821,312 399,477
1730-34 583,707 86,606 57,503 727,816 241,070
1735-39 580,458 137,233 66,981 784,672 315,543
1740-44 619,309 98,252 95,139 812,700 288,050
1745-49 479,593 144,553 60,042 684,188 262,261
1750-54 406,706 169,892 55,576 632,174 532,865
1755-59 307,776 106,646 55,770 470,192 321,251
B. 1771-1792
To Britain via EIC from:
Bengal Madras Surat Three
centres
1771-74 652,158 182,588 93,683 928,429
1775-79 584,889 197,306 48,412 830,607
1780-84 435,340 79,999 40,488 555,827
1785-89 697,483 67,181 38,800 803,464
1790-92 727,717 170,442 38,707 936,866
Sources: 1665-1759: Chaudhuri (1978: 540-545); Morineau (1999: 273-274). 1771-
1794: Milburn [1813, vol.2: 234].
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TABLE 6: Indian exports of cotton textiles, 1790-1859 (thousand pieces per year)
Exports to Britain Total exports
Bengal Total
India
Bengal Total
India
1790-99 787 2,200 4,500
1800-09 1,331 1,824
1810-19 1,358
1820-29 431
1830-39 6 271 478 3,000
1840-49 304 2,606
1850-59 2,279
Source: Twomey (1983: 42-44).
TABLE 7: Weekly earnings of cotton operatives in Britain and India, circa 1680-
1820 (s/d)
Lancashire India Lancashire as
% of India
c.1680 6s/0d 1s/6d 400
c.1770 9s/0d 1s/6d 600
c.1790 13s/3d 2s/0d 663
c.1820 10s/4d 2s/0d 517
Sources and notes: India: circa 1680: Brennig (1986: 348-349) for southern India;
circa 1770: Arasaratnam (1980: 269) for southern India, Chaudhury (1999: 161-162)
for Bengal; circa 1790: Arasaratnam (1980: 269), Ramaswamy(1985: 156),
Mukherjee (1967:25) for southern India; Chaudhury (1999: 161-162), Hossain (1988:
52-53), Chaudhury (1999: 163-165) for Bengal; circa 1820: Mitra, (1978: 128-129),
Buchanan Hamilton, (1833: 296-298) for Bengal. All Indian earnings given on a
monthly basis converted to a weekly basis on the assumption of a 4-week month.
Lancashire: circa 1680: Gilboy (1934: 280-287); circa 1770: Wadsworth and Mann
[1931: 401-402]; circa 1790: Wood (1910: 112); circa 1820: Wood (1910: 127).
Lancastrian earnings given on a weekly basis, except Gilboy (1934), given on a daily
basis and converted to a weekly basis on the assumption of a 6-day week.
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TABLE 8: Best-practice labour productivity in spinning 80s yarn in England,
1780-1825 (operative hours to process 100 lb of cotton)
Technology OHP
1780 Crompton’s mule 2,000
1790 100 spindle mule 1,000
1795 Power-assisted mule 300
1825 Roberts’ automatic mule 135
Source: Derived from Catling (1970: 54).
TABLE 9: English cotton yarn and cloth prices deflated by general price index,
1780-1829
Yarn (d per lb) Cloth (s per piece)
18s weft 40s warp 100s twist calico muslin
1780/4 47 168 -- 52 116
1785/9 47 142 761 43 80
1790/4 36 97 318 34 64
1795/9 36 77 112 29 44
1800/4 27 55 80 24 38
1805/9 19 39 66 16 35
1810/4 15 30 50 18 27
1815/9 15 30 62 19 31
1820/4 11 22 51 15 40
1825/9 10 20 52 10 33
Note: The general price index used to deflate the nominal prices is from Feinstein
(1995). Deflated yarn and cloth prices are in constant 1825/9 prices.
Source: Harley (1998: 55, 59).
TABLE 10: Anglo-Indian comparative wages, labour productivity and unit
labour costs in cotton textiles, 1770-1820 (India=100)
Comparative
silver wages
Comparative
labour
productivity
Comparative
unit labour
costs
1770 600 250 240
1820 517 1625 32
Sources: Derived from Tables 7-9. See text for details.
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TABLE 11: Price of raw cotton in Britain, 1680-1879
d per lb d per lb
1680-89 7 1780-89 23
1690-99 7 1790-99 24
1700-09 7 1800-09 17
1710-19 9 1810-19 19
1720-29 10 1820-29 16
1730-39 10 1830-39 8
1740-49 10 1840-49 5
1750-59 16 1850-59 6
1760-69 16 1860-69 15
1770-79 16 1870-79 8
Sources: 1680-1780: Wadsworth and Mann [1931: Appendix H]; 1780-1879: Mitchell
(1988: 759-760).
Notes: Before 1800, annual averages for West Indian cotton are calculated as the
mean of the range quoted, and decade averages are obtained from the incomplete
number of annual observations. After 1800, data are annual average prices for upland
or middling American cotton.
TABLE 12: Comparative raw cotton prices in Britain and India, 1710-1830
GB
(d per lb)
India
(d per lb)
GB/India
(India=100)
1710 8 4.4 182
1740 9 4.6 196
1792-93 24 5.0 480
1802-03 14 6.3 222
1812-13 20 6.3 317
1822-23 8 6.3 127
Sources: India: 1710, 1740: Mukund (1999: 84) gives the cotton price in the south as
23 pagodas per candy of 500 lb in 1710, with 1 pagoda equal to 8s (Chaudhuri, 1978:
471); 1792-1823: Mitra (1999: 126-127) gives average cotton prices in Bengal as
12.42 rupees per maund of 74.5 lb in 1792-93; Britain: Wadsworth and Mann [1931:
Appendix H]; Mitchell (1988: 759-760).
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TABLE 13: Comparative GB/India wage and cotton costs combined (India =100)
Wages
(W/W*)
Raw cotton
(C/C*)
Combined costs
5.05.0 *)/(*)/( CCWW
FOB
price
(P/P*)
TFP
(A/A*)
c.1680 400 182 270 200 135
c.1770 600 320 438 200 219
c.1790 663 480 564 150 376
c.1820 517 127 256 43 596
Sources: Wages and raw cotton costs derived from Tables 7 and 12; Prices FOB
derived from Chaudhuri (1978) for 1680 and 1770, extended to 1790 and 1820 using
Cuenca Esteban (1994).
TABLE 14: Capital- labour ratios in Great Britain, 1760-1850 (1850=100)
Whole economy Cotton
Total net
fixed capital
stock per
head
Plant,
equipment,
machinery
per head
Fixed
capital
per
worker
1760 63.4 36.3
1770 62.6 36.6
1780 62.9 39.0
1790 64.8 43.9
1800 67.8 47.1
1810 69.1 50.6 13.9
1820 69.9 52.4 22.3
1830 74.1 64.5 26.0
1840 85.2 82.1 47.3
1850 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Whole economy: capital stock from Feinstein (1988: 454); population from
Wrigley et al. (1997: 614); Cotton industry: fixed capital in current prices from
Chapman and Butt (1988: 124-125) converted to constant prices using the implicit
deflator of gross capital in manufacturing from Feinstein (1988: 433, 448).
Employment from Mitchell (1988: 376).
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FIGURE 2: Indian textile prices, 1665-1759
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FIGURE 1: Textile and grain prices in England, 
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